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(Sgd) *M.H.*  
Date *21/8/76*

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FILE No. *NBR 3/324/1* (Part *1*)

TITLE: *POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN  
IRAQ AND IRAN*

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*1976*

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PART

FILE No. *NBR 3/324/1*



EN AIR

FM KUWAIT 060925Z

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1

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 35
8 JAN 1973
TO
COPY
NBR 3/324/1

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 19 OF 6 JAN, <sup>1973</sup> INFO BAGHDAD , CAIRO, AND TEHRAN.

IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS.

1. AL RAI AL A'AM OF 4 JANUARY PUBLISHED A REPORT, ATTRIBUTED TO ARAB POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN KUWAIT, THAT EGYPT IS SHOWING GREAT INTEREST IN THE IRAQI/IRANIAN DISPUTE AND IS TRYING TO BRING IT TO AN END BEFORE IT REACHES THE POINT OF AN OPEN CLASH BETWEEN THE TWO. THE IRANIANS WERE SAID TO HAVE RESPONDED FAVOURABLY TO AN INDICATION (FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE MFA TO THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO) OF EGYPT'S READINESS TO ACT AS MEDIATOR; AND AN OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN DELEGATION WAS 'HURRIED' TO BAGHDAD ON 2 JANUARY. EGYPT WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS AT THE CONTINUATION AND AGGRAVATION OF THE DISPUTE, WHICH COULD AFFECT THE PREPARATIONS FOR CONFRONTING ISRAEL.

2. AL SIYASA OF 5 JANUARY CARRIED AN IRAQI NEWS AGENCY REPORT OF AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION UNDER ENGINEER HASSAN AL DAWI, CHAIRMAN OF THE EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION, HAVING ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD ON 2 JANUARY TO NEGOTIATE THE PURCHASE OF UP TO TWO MILLION TONS OF IRAQI CRUDE TO BE DELIVERED DURING 1973.

WILTON

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DEFENCE DEPT  
NEWS DEPT

*Mr Smith to see for  
88/1*



(2)

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PRIORITY  
EN CLAIR

FM B C IDAD 070630Z JANUARY

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 10 OF 7 JANUARY 1973

INFO TEHERAN.

IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS.

UNDER THIS HEADLINE BAGHDAD PRESS REPORTED 3 JANUARY  
THAT ON 31 DECEMBER IRANIAN FORCES OPENED FIRE ON IRAQ  
BORDER UNITS IN THE MANDALI AREA (45 MILES SOUTH OF  
KHANAQIN).

THE FIRE WAS REPEATED ON 2 JANUARY.

TWO MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI BORDER FORCES WERE KILLED AND  
FOUR WOUNDED.

2.

ON 5 JANUARY IT WAS REPORTED THAT FIVE IRANIAN PATRIOTS WERE  
EXECUTED ON 4 JANUARY FOR ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE SHAH'S  
REGIME.

THEY WERE:

ISSA MOHAMMADI - SALEH IRAN-PANAH - LATIF HUSSEINI -  
ALI SADIGHI AND SADIQ ASSEM ABIDAR.

MCCLUNEY

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EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 110707Z JAN

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 019 OF 11 JAN <sup>73</sup> INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN.

MY TELNO 10

IRAQ-IRAN

IRAQ MOD SPOKESMAN HAS STATED THAT,

'ON THE MORNING OF 10 JANUARY AN IRANIAN  
MILITARY HELICOPTER VIOLATED IRAQI AIR SPACE IN THE  
MANDALI AREA. IT WAS FORCED TO LAND WITHIN  
IRAQI TERRITORY. ITS CREW ARE BEING INTERROGATED''.

MCCLUNEY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 35 12 JAN 1973 NBR 3/324/1
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MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS  
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EN CLAIR

FM TEHRAN 140700Z

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4

1973

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 38 14 JANUARY/INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

③ - BAGHDAD TELNO 19: IRAQ/IRAN.

15/1  
15/1

1. PRESS OF 13 JAN QUOTES AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AS RIDICULING A RADIO BAGHDAD REPORT THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF AN IRANIAN AIR FORCE HELICOPTER FORCED TO LAND IN IRAQ ON 10 JANUARY HAD SOUGHT AND BEEN GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM.
2. THE SPOKESMAN IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THE HELICOPTER WAS CARRYING FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO HELP SNOW-BOUND PEOPLE IN WEST IRAN. IT HAD LOST ITS WAY DUE TO A TECHNICAL FAULT OR A NAVIGATIONAL ERROR AND HAD MADE A FORCED LANDING IN IRAQ. IRANIAN FRONTIER GUARDS, WHO HAD ORDERS TO FIRE ON ANY UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTER, HAD FIRED ON IT SINCE THEY COULD NOT IDENTIFY IT. INFORMED SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE DAMAGED THE AIRCRAFT AND FORCED IT TO STRAY, WHILE "POLITICAL OBSERVERS" NOTED THAT THE HELICOPTER WAS NOT A GUNSHIP NOR WAS ITS CREW ARMED. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT WHEN AN IRAQI VESSEL RAN AGROUND SEVERAL MONTHS AGO NEAR KHORRAMSHAHR, IRANIAN OFFICIALS SPARED NO EFFORT TO FREE THE SHIP AND HELP THE CREW, BUT "THE BAGHDAD BA'ATHISTS ARE SO POLITICALLY BANKRUPT" THAT THEY HAD TO RESORT TO CRUDE AND INHUMANE TACTICS.
3. TO-DAYS PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAN HAS FORMALLY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF THE THREE MAN CREW THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD AND THAT NO REPLY HAD BEEN RECEIVED TO AN IRANIAN REQUEST THAT THE THREE MEN BE ALLOWED TO TALK TO A NEUTRAL BODY WHICH COULD DETERMINE THE MEN'S REAL INTENTIONS.

RAMSBOTHAM.

FILES

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MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

MOD INT





BRITISH EMBASSY  
DOHA QATAR

10/3

A D Harris Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH



9 January 1973

Mr Bury 15/1  
Mr Smith 15/1  
Mr Hunt 16/1  
Mr Wager

Dear Tony,

# ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN DOHA

1. Both the Amir and the Foreign Minister entertained me on separate occasions with tales of further tiresome practices by the Iraqi Ambassador to Doha.
2. Apparently he was discovered by the police to be distributing books in Arabic of a strongly anti-Iranian flavour dealing with the history of quarrels between Iran and Iraq. These were apparently being distributed by members of his staff and each copy of the book carried a stamp showing that it was distributed by the Iraqi Embassy in Doha.
3. Both Shaikhs told me that they had informed the Iraqi Ambassador in no uncertain terms that this practice must never be repeated and that he must not on any account dabble in politics in any way. They had already reproved him for writing articles in the local press on political matters.
4. Both Shaikhs then said that they did not blame the Ambassador himself whom they quite like, but the regime and, in his Embassy, the accountant who was responsible for all this work. They regard the Ambassador himself as an innocent.
5. I was amused to note immediately after this the Ambassador started making friendly gestures to me whenever we met on public occasions. Previously he tried to avoid even shaking hands.
6. I have the impression that the Qataris are quite pleased with themselves and have probably done rather well in not insisting on his removal and making a public fuss, since his wings will clearly be rather clipped from now onwards although I have no doubt that his junior staff will continue to do their worst.

Yours an,  
Edward.

E F Henderson

Copy to: Chanceries KUWAIT  
JEDDA  
TEHRAN  
MUSCAT  
BAHRAIN  
ABU DHABI

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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY  
British Interests  
Section

6



BAGHDAD

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3/2

16 January 1973

B Smith Esq  
Middle East Department  
F C O

RECEIVED
NO 35
22 JAN 1973
NBR 3/324/1

*Dear Brian,*

IRAQ - IRAN

- ③ - 1. In my telno 019 of 11 January I reported the landing of an Iranian Military helicopter near Mandali on 10 January. The Arabic press has rounded off this story with the news that the crew have requested political asylum in Iraq, and this has been granted. They are not named.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink.

*Yours ever  
I.*

I McCluney

c.c. Chancery  
TEHRAN





**British Embassy**  
Tehran

Brian Smith Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

*I have had a separate  
reference to this report  
made to Tehran.*

Your reference

Our reference 3/5

Date 30 January 1973

Dear Brian,

IRAQ/IRAN

*ms*  
*Enter*  
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*pen Dept (ref para 5)*  
*Thanks. 12/2*  
*Back to me 12/2*  
*B.A. 12/2*  
*1 week 12/2*  
*12/2*

REC REGIST
12 FEB 1973
NBR 3/324/1

④- 1. Please refer to our telegram No. 38 of 14 January.

2. General Palizban, Head of J2, tells us that as far as they are aware the helicopter strayed over the Iraqi border by mistake. There was nothing in the personal records of the officer and the two NCOs concerned which would suggest that they might have wanted to seek asylum. The press has continued to ridicule the idea that they might have sought asylum, arguing that the fact that the Iraqis did not announce the men's request for asylum until 24 hours after the incident shows it to be nonsense.

3. General Palizban fears that the Iraqis may be treating this as the opportunity they have been waiting for to get their revenge on the Iraqi Sukhoi-7 jet fighter whose pilot sought and was granted asylum in Iran last year. In that case, the Iranians eventually handed the plane back but not the pilot and Palizban thinks that in this case the Iraqis may therefore return the helicopter but not the crew. Aware that the Arab Governments, to whom they have appealed, are unlikely to have much leverage with the Iraqis and that we and the Americans have even less, the Iranians may well turn to the Soviet Union to intercede on their behalf with the Iraqis.

4. The continued detention of the crew in Iraq had until recently been given a surprisingly mild reception in the Tehran press. Khalatbari was reported as saying in the press interview on a variety of subjects that there were several factors which forced the countries to have normal relations with each other, and that sooner or later relations between the two countries were going to improve. But there are now signs that the Iranians are running out of patience. Official briefing was reflected in the press of 29 January which warned Iraq that if official representations to the Government through the Swiss had no effect the

/Iranian



SECRET



Iranian Government would take up the issue in other international fora. An accompanying editorial in Kayhan International added that failing such efforts, Iran was naturally entitled to take stronger measures. This sterner tone is part of Iran's standard vocabulary in referring to the Iraqis and usually presages no more than an attempt to raise the issue in the United Nations, but we must be prepared for this.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to UKMis New York together with a copy of our telegram under reference.

*Unus,  
Mike*

*for* H J Arbuthnott

SECRET



IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A

S E C R E T

FM TEHRAN 131100Z

S E C R E T

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 140 13 FEBRUARY/1973 INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL  
AND ROUTINE ISLAMABAD.



IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I DOUBT WHETHER AFGHAN MEDIATION WILL PROVE A REWARDING EXERCISE. I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE SHAH ASKED THE AFGHANS TO MEDIATE. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS TOOK THE INITIATIVE. IF THE SHAH ORDERED AN IRANIAN DOSSIER TO BE PREPARED, THIS COULD BE BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH IRAN'S CASE TO GO BY DEFAULT.

2. THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR WHEN BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF THIRD PARTIES. KHALATBARI TOLD ME OF AN EGYPTIAN INTEREST IN PROMOTING A RECONCILIATION, AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAS, WE KNOW, BEEN KEEPING THE IRANIANS INFORMED OF HIS CAUTIOUS EFFORTS WITH THE IRAQIS. BUT NONE OF THIS HAS LED TO ANYTHING AND THE IRANIANS REMAIN SCEPTICAL. THE LATEST HELICOPTER INCIDENT AND THE IRAQI ARMS' SMUGGLING IN ISLAMABAD WILL MAKE THE CLIMATE EVEN LESS PROPITIOUS.

3. BUT THE CHIEF STUMBLING BLOCK STILL REMAINS THE DISPUTE OVER THE SHATT-AL-ARAB. IRAN CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT IRAQ MUST RECOGNISE THE ABROGATION OF THE 1937 TREATY AND THE TALVEG PRINCIPLE AS A PRE-CONDITION OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE AFGHANS CANNOT PREVAIL UPON THE IRAQIS TO CONCEDE THIS POINT AT AN EARLY STAGE, THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS. IN VIEW OF OUR SPECIAL ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE 1937 TREATY, AND OUR PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF IT, IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ADVISE THE AFGHANS HOW TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM. BUT I SEE NO HARM IN OUR TELLING THEM THAT WE WELCOME ANY STEP THAT WOULD LEAD TO A LESSENING OF TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

RAMSBOTHAM.

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*Dfr reply* *msb*  
*7/2*



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FM KABUL 320805Z  
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9

D  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 67 OF 12 FEBRUARY 1973 AND TO IMMEDIATE IN ISLAMABAD, INFO IMMEDIATE TO TEHRAN. (FCO PLEASE PASS ALL).  
REGISTERED IN  
REGISTRY No. 35  
14 FEB 1973  
NBR 3/324/1

IRANIAN/IRAQI RELATIONS.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY EVENING AND SAID THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR PERSONAL ADVICE BASED ON YOUR LONG EXPERIENCE OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. NO ONE ELSE KNEW THAT HE WAS CONSULTING YOU AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD OBSERVE APPROPRIATE DISCRETION.
2. MR SHAFIQ THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT BOTH THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS HAD RECENTLY INVITED AFGHANISTAN TO MEDIATE ON THEIR MANY OUTSTANDING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN THE AFGHANS DOSSIERS SETTING OUT THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPLAINTS POINTS OF VIEW. THE PROBLEM NOW WAS TO DECIDE WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS THE AFGHANS SHOULD MAKE TO THE TWO SIDES BOTH AS REGARDS POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A LESSENING OF TENSION AND AS REGARDS THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED TO BRING ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENTS. ON THESE TWO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM HE WOULD GREATLY VALUE YOUR VIEWS.
3. WHEN I ASKED IF BOTH SIDES WERE EQUALLY KEEN TO INVOKE AFGHAN MEDIATION MR SHAFIQ REPLIED THAT AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WERE VERY OPEN AND THAT THE IRAQI PRESIDENT WAS PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT AFGHAN MEDIATION. AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE ALWAYS SOMEWHAT INHIBITED BY PREJUDICES ON BOTH SIDES (ALTHOUGH GREAT EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE ON BOTH SIDES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND FOR PRESTIGE REASONS THE IRANIANS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ADMIT THAT THEY NEEDED AFGHAN HELP IN ANYTHING. THE FACT REMAINED HOWEVER, THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF HAD PERSONALLY ORDERED THE IRANIAN DOSSIER TO BE PREPARED AND HANDED OVER TO THE AFGHANS. HE BELIEVED THEREFORE THAT IRAN GENUINELY WANTED AFGHAN MEDIATION.

Off reply  
ms. 14/2

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/4. OUR



CONFIDENTIAL

4. OUR CONVERSATION WAS CUT SHORT BECAUSE MR SHAFIQ HAD ANOTHER APPOINTMENT BUT I AM HOPING TO HAVE A FAIRLY LONG SESSION WITH HIM NEXT SUNDAY, 18 FEBRUARY, AND IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF I COULD AT LEAST HAVE YOUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS BY THEN.

5. EVEN IF WE ARE PRETTY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL AFGHAN MEDIATION I HOPE THAT WE CAN BE AS FORTHCOMING AND ENCOURAGING AS POSSIBLE IF ONLY BECAUSE IT SUITS US TO KEEP A DIALOGUE GOING WITH MR SHAFIQ.

6. FOR ISLAMABAD. PLEASE REPEAT TO US ANY TELEGRAMS ABOUT THE ARMS CACHE RECENTLY FOUND IN THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD WHICH MIGHT BE RELEVANT IN THIS CONTEXT.

7. FCO PLEASE REPEAT TO BAGHDAD IF APPROPRIATE.

DRINKALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO  
ISLAMABAD & TEHRAN ONLY]

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


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FM KABUL 141130Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO.74 OF 14 FEBRUARY<sup>1973</sup>, INFO PRIORITY  
TO TEHRAN AND ISLAMABAD (FCO PSE PSASS).

② TEHRAN TELNO.140: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I HAVE VIRTUALLY NO REPEAT NO BACKGROUND MATERIAL HERE.

I THEREFORE NEED A SUMMARY OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING POINTS  
OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER WITH OUR COMMENTS  
ON THEM INCLUDING WHERE POSSIBLE, RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT WHAT  
WE THINK THE AFGHANS SHOULD SUGGEST TO THE TWO SIDES.

2. I FEAR THAT MR SHAFIQ WILL NOT BE IMPRESSED IF I AM ONLY  
AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT WE WISH HIM WELL IN HIS ATTEMPTS  
TO MEDIATE.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DRINKALL  
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REC  
REGISTRY NUMBER  
16 FEB 1973  
NBR 3/324/1

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Mr Coles

PAKISTAN/IRAQ/IRAN

1. With reference to Islamabad telegram number 492 of 12 February about the arms cache discovered in the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, Mr Amery wonders whether the explanation may not be that the Iraqis have been trying to stir up trouble in Persian Baluchistan in retaliation for the unrest that the Iranians stir up in Iraqi Kurdistan. If this is the Iraqi purpose, it would make sense for them to channel arms and agents into Iran through the Baluch parts of Pakistan, especially in view of the disorder prevailing in parts of Pakistan following the war with India.

✓ 2. In this context, Mr Amery also suggests that it might not be wise for us to give any encouragement to the Afghan Foreign Minister's aspirations to mediate between Iraq and Iran.

(~~Kabul telegram number 67~~). Mr Shafiq is ambitious to play a world role and has perhaps read more into what the Iranians and Iraqis may have said to him than is justified.

M I Goulding


13 February 1973

c.c.

Mr Patrick Wright  
Mr Sutherland

CONFIDENTIAL





Mr Sutherland

# IRAN / IRAQ RELATIONS

1. I attach a draft telegram to Kabul, which has been drafted by MED, and with which I agree subject to the amendment explaining more of the background to the Shatt-al-Arab Treaty. The amendment has been agreed by MED.
2. We are I think justified in declining to advise in this case, and the telegram, in para 2, will provide Mr Drinkall with an adequate excuse for not doing so.

W. P. Howell

14/2

I agree. But we should add a note the effect that the Iraqi arms affair in Urmahel makes this an even more inopportune time to exert in such a mediation. Mr Drinkall can say so.

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16/2

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IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A

S E C R E T

FM TEHRAN 131100Z

S E C R E T

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 140 13 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL  
AND ROUTINE ISLAMABAD.

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I DOUBT WHETHER AFGHAN MEDIATION WILL PROVE A REWARDING EXERCISE. I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE SHAH ASKED THE AFGHANS TO MEDIATE. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS TOOK THE INITIATIVE. IF THE SHAH ORDERED AN IRANIAN DOSSIER TO BE PREPARED, THIS COULD BE BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH IRAN'S CASE TO GO BY DEFAULT.

2. THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR WHEN BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF THIRD PARTIES. KHALATBARI TOLD ME OF AN EGYPTIAN INTEREST IN PROMOTING A RECONCILIATION, AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAS, WE KNOW, BEEN KEEPING THE IRANIANS INFORMED OF HIS CAUTIOUS EFFORTS WITH THE IRAQIS. BUT NONE OF THIS HAS LED TO ANYTHING AND THE IRANIANS REMAIN SCEPTICAL. THE LATEST HELICOPTER INCIDENT AND THE IRAQI ARMS' SMUGGLING IN ISLAMABAD WILL MAKE THE CLIMATE EVEN LESS PROPITIOUS.

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RAMSBOTHAM.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 16 FEB 1973 NBR 3/324/1
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 148 15 FEBRUARY/1973 INFO PRIORITY KABUL,  
ROUTINE ISLAMABAD.

10 - KABUL TELNO 74: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. I RECOGNISE MR DRINKALL'S PROBLEM BUT I MUST POINT OUT THAT UNLESS AND UNTIL WE KNOW THAT THE SHAH WOULD WELCOME AFGHAN MEDIATION, WE MIGHT DAMAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN IF WE WERE TO RESPOND TO THE EXTENT SUGGESTED.

2. EVEN IF WE WERE TO LEARN THAT THE SHAH FAVOURS AFGHAN MEDIATION, WE MAY NOT DO OURSELVES ANY GOOD BY BECOMING INVOLVED SINCE THE IRANIANS ARE BOUND TO HEAR ABOUT IT. THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN QUICK TO SUSPECT US OF FAVOURING IRAQ AT THEIR EXPENSE.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

RAMSBOTHAM.

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1973

TO IMMEDIATE KABUL TELEGRAM NO 72 OF 16 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE  
LAGOS PRIORITY TEHRAN ROUTINE ISLAMABAD

(4)

(9) - YOUR TEL NO 67 AND TEHRAN TEL NO 140: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. HM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN HAS RIGHTLY COMMENTED THAT ATTEMPTS TO  
MEDIATE ARE UNLIKELY TO PROVE REWARDING. AND THOUGH THE IRANIANS  
WOULD NO DOUBT WELCOME ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH  
IRAQ WE DO NOT THINK THE SHAH WOULD REGARD THE AFGHANS AS EFFECTIVE  
MEDIATORS.

2. APART FROM OUR GENERAL DESIRE NOT TO RISK HARMING OUR RELATIONS  
WITH IRAN WE ARE FACED WITH TWO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES IN  
RESPONDING TO THE AFGHAN'S REQUEST:

A. WE HAVE SEEN NEITHER THE IRANIAN NOR THE IRAQI DOSSIER  
(YOUR PARA 2) AND IT IS NOT THEREFORE POSSIBLE FOR US TO SUGGEST  
TO WHICH POINTS THE AFGHANS SHOULD PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION. IT  
FOLLOWS OF COURSE THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SUGGEST HOW  
BEST TO CARRY OUT ANY RECOMMENDATIONS THE AFGHANS MAY MAKE.

B. AS THE AFGHANS ARE AWARE OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, IN CONTRAST  
TO OUR EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH IRAN, ARE COOL, AND OUR REPRESENT-  
ATION IN BAGHDAD IS LIMITED TO A CARETAKER INTERESTS SECTION. WE  
ARE NOT THEREFORE IN A GOOD POSITION TO GAUGE THE LIKELY IRAQI  
RESPONSE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS THE AFGHANS MAY MAKE.

3. WE AGREE WITH HM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN THAT WE COULD WELL GET INTO  
DIFFICULTIES IF WE TRY TO ADVISE THE AFGHANS HOW TO APPROACH THE  
PROBLEM OF THE SHATT-AL-ARAB.

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SECTION 5(1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958 UNTIL 2014

AND WE SHOULD PREFER YOU NOT  
TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE IRANIAN  
AND IRAQI INTERPRETATION OF THEIR RIGHTS.

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/4. THE DISCOVERY



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4. THE DISCOVERY OF IRAQI ARMS IN ISLAMABAD LAST WEEK MAKES THIS A PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE MOMENT TO CONSIDER MEDIATION, SINCE IRANIAN SUSPICIONS OF IRAQI INTENTIONS CAN ONLY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. THE IRANIANS WILL CONCLUDE THAT THE ARMS WERE INTENDED FOR USE IN BALUCHISTAN AND HENCE AIMED, EVEN IF INDIRECTLY, AT IRANIAN BALUCHISTAN. MOREOVER WE WOULD NOT WISH TO RISK DAMAGING OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN BY INVOLVING OURSELVES WITH IRAQI AFFAIRS AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE.

5. ACCORDINGLY WE THINK YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WHILST WE SHOULD NATURALLY WELCOME ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ THIS IS, REGRETTABLY, NOT A PROBLEM ON WHICH WE FEEL ABLE TO ADVISE. YOU SHOULD THEN EXPLAIN OUR DIFFICULTIES AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 2B AND 4 ABOVE. WE DO NOT THINK YOU SHOULD USE PARAGRAPH 2(A) ABOVE SINCE THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE AFGHANS TO OFFER US COPIES OF THE DOSSIERS.

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ACT 1958 UNTIL ..... 2014 .....



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*Minister.*

15

Mr. Persons

Mr. Coles

Private Secretary

*I am sure this is right. Last belief agree with the telegram as amended. A.S. 6/6 1/5 If we get 2 involved, the Afghans may well try to cast us in some fig in the middle role on a stage filled with Thomy problems in which our past history has involved us. We have nothing to gain by involvement except pleasing Mr. Shafiq. Anglo-Iranian relations and even Anglo-Iraqi relations are more important than this.*

#### IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

A ②

1. HM Ambassador, Kabul has asked on behalf of the Afghan Prime Minister for the Secretary of State's advice on how best to mediate between Iran and Iraq.
2. I see little prospect of such mediation being successful (the Turks and the Egyptians have both made some unsuccessful attempts during the past year). Moreover, the main bone of contention (frontier delineation in the Shatt al Arab) is a particularly difficult problem for us.

We have, therefore, nothing

much to gain in terms of an improved situation in the area and much to lose in Anglo-Iranian relations by getting involved.

3. Accordingly, I attach a draft telegram to Kabul in terms which I hope will make clear to the Afghans without offence why we cannot meet their request.
4. The draft has been agreed with South Asian Department who are content that it should go in this form rather than as a message from the Secretary of State. Since the incoming telegram asked for "personal advice", however, the Private Secretary may wish to see the reply before it is despatched.

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5. Mr Amery commented on the first telegram from Kabul that "it might not be wise for us to give any encouragement to the Afghan Foreign Minister's aspirations to mediate between Iraq and Iran. Mr Shafiq is ambitious to play a world role and has perhaps read more into what the Iranians and Iraqis may have said to him than is justified".

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P R H Wright', enclosed within a large, loopy oval flourish.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

15 February 1973

cc: MrSutherland (SAD)

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO.85 OF 20 FEBRUARY, INFO PRIORITY  
TO TEHRAN, AND ROUTINE TO ISLAMABAD.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 35  
21 FEB 1973  
NBR 5/3241)

14

YOUR TELNO.72: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I SPOKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY AS INSTRUCTED  
STICKING CLOSELY TO THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 2(B) AND PARA  
4 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. MR SHAFIQ WAS CLEARLY  
DISAPPOINTED. HE AGREED THAT THE DISCOVERY OF THE IRAQI  
ARMS IN ISLAMABAD WAS A SET BACK TO HIS ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION  
BUT THOUGHT THAT THE DUST SHOULD HAVE SETTLED BY MAY WHEN THE  
PRESIDENT OF IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY BE VISITING AFGHANISTAN.  
HE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT BOTH SIDES WANTED AFGHAN MEDIATION.

2. MR SHAFIQ THEN ASKED IF WE COULD NOT AT LEAST PROVIDE  
HIM WITH DOCUMENTATION ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB DISPUTE.  
I REPLIED THAT AS HE ALREADY HAD DOSSIERS DIRECT FROM THE  
TWO SIDES SETTING OUT THEIR RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW ON  
THE VARIOUS ISSUES IN DISPUTE I COULD NOT SEE HOW WE COULD  
POSSIBLY CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING USEFUL.

3. I ACCEPT THAT ON THIS OCCASION IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACT  
IN A TOTALLY NEGATIVE WAY BUT I HOPE THAT WE SHALL, WHENEVER  
OPPORTUNITY OFFERS, TRY TO GIVE MR SHAFIQ THE IMPRESSION  
THAT WE WISH TO CONSULT HIM ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND TO  
GIVE HIM ADVICE WHEN HE ASKS FOR IT.

FCO PASS ALL

padu/2

DRINKALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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
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17

#10



British Embassy  
Tehran



B Smith Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 1 March 1973

Dear Brian,

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. Hugh Arbuthnott, in his letter of 30 January, forecast that the Iranians might raise the question of the Helicopter crew detained in Iraq at the United Nations. They have now done so indirectly in the form of a letter to the Secretary General from the families of the crew asking him to prevail upon the Iraqi Government to allow the detained men "fundamental human rights". An editorial, clearly inspired, in the Tehran Journal of 28 February, urged the UN to effect the release of the men.
2. Despite this and the Iraqi arms affair, for which the Baghdad Government was roundly condemned in the Tehran press, the Iranians have not stopped dropping hints periodically that they are prepared to talk with the Iraqis. The latest of these was the prominence given to an interview with Hoveyda in the Cairo daily "Akhbar" in which Hoveyda was quoted as saying that Iran wanted a settlement. This was after the discovery of the Iraqi arms in Islamabad.
3. If there are to be talks they will have to be on Iran's terms. You will have seen our assessment of what these might be in our telegram No 140.

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IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

Mr. Ellison

UN Sept to see 5/ij

pa 8

Yours sincerely  
Nick

cc: Chanceries KABUL  
UKM15 NEW YORK

N W Browne  
Entered file  
Mr Wenbar-Smith  
You should know of these papers. I have not yet seen X.

SECRET

Key to

I think all in need is  
a copy that has not yet been  
the late copy which you beyond the human rights question, which  
is much anticipated. 12/12

I. Ellison 9/11





## D. I R A N

*Enter - a S<sub>u</sub>/2***Tehran Attack on Iraqi Ba'thist Regime****Tehran home service 1030 gmt 18 Feb 73****Excerpts from commentary:**

How are we to appraise incidents emanating from the Ba'thists? If Iraq had been enjoying a national government in recent years and had been in a position to devote its income to implementing economic projects by proper planning, it would now be in a position to leave the group of backward countries and join the newly-emerging developing countries. If that were the case, Iraq, which has a population of eight million people and with no industries and experts, would not pose a danger in the Middle East as a non-industrial, consumer country dependent on oil income. . .

What has turned Iraq into a threatening base is its economic situation. This country, which could join the newly-emerging countries with its oil income and its other extensive sources of income, has squandered all its resources on domestic killings and foreign intrigues. While the Iraqi people are deprived of an opportunity to embark on some constructive efforts, and while they cannot look forward to a better future, the Ba'thist rulers have placed Iraq entirely at the disposal of greedy and opportunist foreigners. In exchange for this prostituted generosity the Ba'thist rulers receive their daily government expenditure from foreigners.

Iraq's bleak poverty, its impotence and its loss of hope for the future have all turned Iraq into a dangerous foreign base in the Middle East. What is important to foreigners is their ability to force the innocent Iraqi people into doing anything which serves the foreigner's interests in exchange for a small reward. What the foreigners want is to give arms to these needy and desperate Ba'thists in order to deprive the Middle East of security and tranquillity.

This unfortunate situation which is a threat to peace and tranquillity has come about as a result of treachery perpetrated by the Ba'thist rulers of Iraq. The rulers themselves are a victim of the conspiracies by the united forces of colonialism who want chaos and disturbance in the Middle East and whose foul aim is to prevent potentially rich Middle Eastern countries from becoming industrialized and from achieving economic development and progress. This is so that they can rule over a starving people in exchange for a piece of bread and ideas which make vague promises of a piece of bread, on the one hand, but turns free nations into slaves, on the other.

Our country's daily increasing economic prosperity is unwelcome to these wielders of power. However, the Iranian people, who have achieved their wide-spread prosperity by hard work and struggle, will not change their independent national policy because of piratical threats. It is the attitude of greedy foreigners to Iran which must change.

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United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations  
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 16 MAR 1973 NDR 31324/1
--

B Smith Esq  
Middle East Dept  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

2/13/4

9 March, 1973

*Dear Smith,*

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. (17) - Please refer to Browne's letter of 1 March.

2. I could not recall having seen any letter circulated about the Iranian helicopter crew detained in Iraq. I therefore spoke to a member of the Iranian Mission and, basing myself on the press reports, asked whether he could confirm that his Government had in fact raised the matter with the Secretary-General. Talieh told me that the Secretary-General had been away when Hoveyda had first been instructed to raise the matter with him and Hoveyda had therefore taken action with Bradford Morse, the Under-Secretary General for Political and General Assembly affairs. Following the Secretary-General's return, Hoveyda had raised it with him personally and had also written to him requesting that he should speak to the Iraqis to try to arrange for the helicopter crew to be interviewed either by someone from Tehran or by the Swiss Ambassador, who looks after Iranian interests in Baghdad. Hoveyda had also sent Waldheim a letter from the families of the crew. Talieh went on to say that neither letter had been published because the aim of the Iranian Government was not to embarrass the Iraqis on this particular issue but rather to secure the return of the crew to Iran, on the assumption that this was what the crew wanted and that the Iraqi claim that they wished to stay in Iraq was untrue. The Secretary-General had spoken to the Iraqi Acting Permanent Representative who had promised to get in touch with his Government and communicate further with the Secretary-General in due course. He has not yet done so.

*Yours ever,*

*Michael Weston*  
M C S Weston

Copied to:-

N W Browne, Esq., TEHRAN.

Chancery: Kabul



FM TEHRAN 191310Z

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OPS 650

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 333 OF 19 APRIL. 1973

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD.

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NBR 3/324/

19

# IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER OF COURT AFTER MY RETURN FROM LONDON, MR ALAM RAISED THIS SUBJECT. THERE WERE, HE SAID, SIGNS THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WERE WISHING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. FOR THEIR PART, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO ANY GENUINE INITIATIVE. HE WONDERED WHAT WE THOUGHT ABOUT THIS OR, INDEED, ABOUT OUR OWN PRESENT RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

2. I SAID THAT SINCE IRAQ HAD SIMULTANEOUSLY BROKEN OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND IRAN BECAUSE OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS, IT WAS RIGHT THAT, AS ALLIES, WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH OVER ANY QUESTIONS OF IMPROVING OUR RESPECTIVE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. BEARING IN MIND OUR OWN PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS (HUNT'S LETTER OF 22 MARCH), I SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE IPC SETTLEMENT, SOME CONSIDERATION WAS NOW BEING GIVEN TO THIS, IF THE IRAQIS WERE INTERESTED. ALAM SAID HE WOULD INFORM THE SHAH OF OUR CONVERSATION.

3. AT DINNER WITH THE SHAH ON 17 APRIL, WE DISCUSSED IRAQ. HE ASKED WHETHER I AGREED THAT THE TIME WAS NOW RIPE TO SEE WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO IMPROVE HER RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. HE DID NOT WANT TO HAVE IRAQ AS A PERMANENT ENEMY. NOR WAS THAT IN THE IRAQI INTEREST. IRAQ WAS NOT ON GOOD TERMS WITH ANYONE, LEAST OF ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES. SHE WOULD NOT WISH TO BE A SOVIET SATELLITE. HE WAS NOT SEEKING THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRAQI ECONOMY. INDEED HE HAD TOLD THE OIL COMPANIES' REPRESENTATIVES AT ST. MORITZ THAT HE WOULD BE CONTENT WITH AN IPC AGREEMENT FAVOURABLE TO THE IRAQIS. MOREOVER, WITH A 40 KILOMETRE FRONTIER ON THE PERSIAN

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GULF, IRAQ HAD A LEGITIMATE INTEREST AND A RIGHT TO A SAY IN THE AREA. HE WOULD RESPECT A GENUINE, NATIONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST IN IRAQ FOR FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF. BUT IRAQI SUBVERSION IN THE GULF STATES WAS ANOTHER MATTER AND NOT ESSENTIAL FOR PROMOTING HER INTERESTS THERE.

4. THE SHAH THEN TOLD ME, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, WHICH HE ASKED ME TO BE CAREFUL TO OBSERVE, THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE IRAQI REGIME FOR THE PAST TWO OR THREE MONTHS THROUGH A PERSONAL INTERMEDIARY AND HAD HAD SOME POSITIVE RESPONSES. AS A RESULT, HE HAD NOW ARRANGED FOR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO MEET THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SOON IN GENEVA. SOMETHING MIGHT, HE SAID, COME OF THIS. BUT HE WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO BE TRICKED OR TO GIVE AWAY ANY TRUMP CARD AT THE IRAQI'S REQUEST.

5. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS CONFIDENCE AND AGAIN MENTIONED THAT WE, TOO, WERE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING RELATIONS IF THE IRAQIS WERE INTERESTED. I KNEW THAT HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE WOULD BE APPROACHING THIS IN A PRACTICAL WAY. BUT I HOPED WE COULD KEEP IN TOUCH. THE SHAH AGREED.

RAMSBOTHAM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MR PARSONS

PRIVATE SECRETARY

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 334 OF 19 APRIL 1973

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REGISTRY No. 35  
24 APR 1973  
NBR 3/524/1

19 MYTEL NO 333 : IRAQ/IRAN.

1. IN SPEAKING OF GIVING UP A TRUMP CARD, THE SHAH SAID HE HAD IN MIND THE SUPPORT HE WAS GIVING TO THE KURDS. BARZANI WOULD NOT LAST FOR EVER AND HIS SUUCCESSORS, UNDER IRAQI AND RUSSIAN PRESSURES, WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION.

RAMSBOTHAM.

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*[Signature] 1/5*

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FM TEHRAN 240930Z

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21 APR 1973  
NBR 3/324/1

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 342 OF 24 APRIL 1973  
INFO TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, KUWAIT

19 MY TEL NO 333: IRAN/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS  
TO HAVE LEFT YESTERDAY FOR EUROPE FOR A MEDICAL  
CHECK-UP. THIS IS PROBABLY THE VISIT MENTIONED  
IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

RAMSBOTHAM

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MR PARSONS

*mas*

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FM TELAN 011000Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 363 OF 30 APRIL 1973,  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD,  
CAIRO, KABUL, ANKARA.

MYTELS NOS. 333 AND 342 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME TODAY. HE HAD, HE SAID, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A FOUR-DAY TRIP TO EUROPE, OSTENSIBLY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT, THOUGH, AS THE SHAH HAD INFORMED ME, HE HAD IN FACT GONE TO GENEVA FOR TALKS WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, SA'ID ABDUL BAQI. THE FIRST FEELER HAD COME SOME MONTHS AGO FROM THE IRAQIS (POSSIBLY UNDER SOME SOVIET PRESSURE) BUT THE INITIATIVE FOR THE MEETING HAD BEEN IRAN'S. AN IRANIAN OF DISTINCTION, BUT NOT CONNECTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT, HAD GONE TO BAGHDAD AND THE IRAQIS HAD QUICKLY ACCEPTED THE PROPOSED MEETING.


2. THE TALKS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN A QUIET ATMOSPHERIC WITHOUT POLEMICS. ABDUL BAQI HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN IRAQI GENERAL, AND AN EDITOR OF A PAPER WHO IS SAID TO BE NO. 3 IN THE BA'ATHIST HIERARCHY. THEY HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO SUBJECTS:

(A) THE ISLANDS

(B) SHATT-EL-ARAB.

ON THE FIRST THE IRAQIS ARGUED THAT, SINCE IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS HAD BEEN THE REASON FOR BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, THE IRAQI POSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE STATED IN ANY EVENTUAL COMMUNIQUE OR AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM THE TALKS. KHALATBARI SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE AND, AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, ABDUL BAQI DID NOT INSIST.

3. SOMEWHAT TO KHALATBARI'S SURPRISE, THE IRAQIS DID NOT RAISE THE KURDISH QUESTION (HE WAS READY TO COUNTER WITH IRAQI ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE BALUCHIS) AND THE TALKS CONCENTRATED ON THE SHATT-EL-ARAB AND THE FRONTIER. HERE THE IRAQIS WERE INFLEXIBLE, INSISTING ON THE TERMS OF THE 1937 TREATY.



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4. KHALATBARI THEN MADE SIX ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS, IN DISCENDING ORDER OF MAGNITUDE:

(I) AN ENTIRELY NEW TREATY WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH FRONTIER DEMARCATION AND NAVIGATION.

(II) A NEW TREATY CONFINED, GEOGRAPHICALLY, TO NAVIGATION WITHOUT MENTIONING FRONTIERS

(III) AN AGREEMENT TO RESTORE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(IV) AN AGREEMENT TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF THE EXISTING INTEREST SECTIONS IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FROM SECOND SECRETARY TO COUNSELLOR RANK

(V) AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH BY CORRESPONDENCE ON DIFFICULTIES ARISING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, WITH A VIEW TO EASING THEM, OR

(VI) AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE COULD BE ANOTHER SIMILAR MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS ON A FUTURE OCCASION.

ABDUL BAQI HAD NEITHER REJECTED NOR ACCEPTED ANY OF THEM AND WAS CLEARLY UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES

IN BAGHDAD. BUT HE SEEMED TO SEE SOME POSSIBILITY IN THE

FOURTH PROPOSAL. KHALATBARI HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT

WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS IF THE BORDER CLASHES WERE REDUCED AND HOSTILE PROPAGANDA DIMINISHED.

5. I THANKED HIM FOR KEEPING US INFORMED, AND TOLD HIM, AS I HAD TOLD THE SHAH, OF OUR OWN PRELIMINARY THINKING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO NOW BE INFORMING, CONFIDENTIALLY, THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET AND PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS,

AND ALSO PERHAPS THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN OFFERING MEDIATION OVER BAGHDAD, VIZ., EGYPT, TURKEY, AND AFGHANISTAN.

6. SEE MIFT.

RAMSBOTHAM.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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
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23

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 364 OF 30 APRIL 1973  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD,  
CAIRO, KABUL, ANKARA.

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22- MIPT IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THIS ATTEMPT AT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN NO DOUBT OWES SOMETHING TO SOVIET PRESSURES ON BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

WE KNOW THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO IRAN IN JANUARY KOSYGIN HAD BEEN URGING THE SHAH TO TRY AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS; IT HAS INDEED BEEN THE DECLARED IRANIAN POLICY TO RESPOND TO ANY GENUINE APPROACH FROM BAGHDAD. AS MOSCOW TEL NO 1 TO KUWAIT POINTS - NBL 3/324/1 OUT, IT IS IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST TO AVOID DISTURBANCES TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE AREA.

IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WOULD CLEARLY HELP IN REDUCING SUCH RISKS. KHALATBARI SAID THAT KOSYGIN, AT IRANIAN REQUEST, HAD PROBABLY BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING THE IRAQIS TO RELEASE THE IRANIAN HELICOPTER PILOTS ( THIS CONFLICTS WITH WHAT THE SHAH HAS SAID TO US PREVIOUSLY WHEN HE DENIED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PLAYED ANY PART IN THIS). THE IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF THE MEETING WITH KHALATBARI AND THEIR PERMITTING THE KUWAITIS TO REOCCUPY SAMITA SUGGEST THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION MAY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

" Reply sent 9/11/73  
4/11/73  
ja

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION OR THOUGHTS WE MAY HAVE WHICH I COULD PASS ON TO KHALATBARI (OR TO THE SHAH WHOM I EXPECT TO SEE IN AUDIENCE ABOUT 8 MAY) TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE KEEPING US INFORMED.

RAMSBOTHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MR. PARSONS

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- 2 MAY 1973

NBR 3/324/1

CYPHER CAT A

FM ISLAMABAD 020710Z

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 1277 OF 2/5/73

23- TEHRAN TEL NO 364:

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

MAY WE PLEASE HAVE COPY OF MOSCOW TEL NO 1 TO KUWAIT. - NBR 3/355/1

HOB DEN

NNNN

My Jewell took  
appropriate action on  
another copy of the  
4/5/73  
ja



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NBR 3/324/1

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TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 215 OF 3 MAY/INFO KUWAIT INFO  
SAVING MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, KABUL, ANKARA.

22 23  
YOUR TELEGRAM NOS. 363 AND 364: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. HM AMBASSADOR, WHEN HE SEES THE SHAH, MAY WISH TO REITERATE  
OUR THANKS FOR BEING TAKEN INTO IRANIAN CONFIDENCE OVER THIS  
EXERCISE.

2. IT IS PERHAPS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE IRAQIS SHOWED NO  
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB PROBLEM. IT IS,  
HOWEVER, DISAPPOINTING THAT THEY WERE NOT FORTHCOMING OVER THE  
POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGING MORE SENIOR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES,  
EVEN IF THEY DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO GO SO FAR AS A RESUMPTION OF  
FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

3. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT PARSONS TOLD AFSHAR ON 30 APRIL THAT  
WE HAD ASKED THE FRENCH TO LET US KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY SIGNS AT  
ALL OF AN IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH  
US. SO FAR THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH SIGNS, THOUGH WE MAY HEAR MORE  
WHEN OFFICIALS FROM THE QUAI D'ORSAY ARE IN LONDON ON 8 MAY. WE  
SHALL LET YOU KNOW THEREAFTER IF THERE ARE ANY DEVELOPMENTS, BUT  
HM AMBASSADOR SHOULD MEANWHILE EMPHASISE TO THE SHAH THAT OUR PURPOSE  
AT PRESENT IS SOLELY TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE IS ANY IRAQI  
WILLINGNESS TO RESUME, AND THAT IN OUR VIEW THE INITIATIVE FOR A  
RESUMPTION MUST COME FROM BAGHDAD. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE ARE  
ANXIOUS THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD NOT RECEIVE (OR GIVE OTHERS,  
EG KUWAIT) THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE RUNNING AFTER THE IRAQIS.

4. THE IRANIANS WILL NO DOUBT BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE RECENTLY  
TAKEN A STEP TOWARDS THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH  
SYRIA BY SENDING A FIRST SECRETARY AND ANOTHER OFFICER TO THE

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BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN DAMASCUS. THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID TH  
HOPE THIS WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 378 7 MAY/INFO ROUTINE PARIS.

(25) YOURTEL NO. 215: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. MY AUDIENCE IS NOW FOR THE MORNING OF 10 MAY. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TELEGRAPH BY 9 MAY AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ARISING FROM YOUR TALKS WITH THE FRENCH ON 8 MAY, WHICH MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO MY DISCUSSION WITH THE SHAH.
2. MAY S.A. DEPT ALSO BE INFORMED, SO THAT I MAY RECEIVE ANY LATE INFORMATION RELEVANT TO PRESIDENT BHUTTO'S VISIT (HE ARRIVES ON AFTERNOON OF 10 MAY).

RAMSBOTHAM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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H. B. ... to me. 3/5 (27)

Mr. Wright,  
Middle East Department

A. Smith

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See 363 - 364. 3/5

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. Mr. Afshar told me last night that the Iranian Foreign Minister had given him an account of his recent discussions in Geneva with the Foreign Minister of Iraq. Mr. Afshar said that this account was being given in strict confidence to HM Ambassador in Tehran

and to the Americans: he thought to no one else for the time being.

2. Mr. Afshar's account of the meeting did not suggest that there was an early prospect of a resumption of relations between Iran and Iraq. He said that the Iraqis had turned down all the Iranian suggestions for a solution or a modus vivendi in the Shatt-el-Arab. To begin with, the Iraqi had said that he had no instructions which would enable him to modify Iraq's position in any way. The Iranian Foreign Minister had suggested either a settlement "in accordance with accepted international practice" or a treaty on navigation setting aside juridical claims. The Iraqi had rejected both these suggestions.

3. The Iranian Foreign Minister had then turned to the question of diplomatic relations. The Iraqi said that the time was not ripe for a resumption. The Iranian had then suggested that contact should be maintained through the appointment of officials of reasonably senior rank - Counsellor - to respective capitals without any formalities about resumption of relations. The Iraqi had undertaken

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to consider this suggestion on his return to Baghdad. This was about the only positive outcome of the meeting. Apparently the Iraqi had even failed to reply to the Iranian suggestion that the two countries should do something to lower the temperature of their relationship.

4. We shall probably receive a report of this meeting from Sir P Ramsbotham. If we do not, we might send a copy of this minute to him in this week's bag.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A D Parsons'. The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial 'A' and a cursive 'D'.

A D Parsons

1 May 1973

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TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 8 MAY 73 INFO ROUTINE  
KUWAIT AND INFO SAVING MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD,  
CAIRO, KABUL, ANKARA

(24) YOUR TEL 378 (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAS ONLY JUST RETURNED TO HIS POST AND HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO REPORT ANY SOUNDINGS. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE QUAI D'ORSAY, HOWEVER, BEFORE DEPARTURE HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL FAVOUR AN EARLY RESUMPTION WITH US IN VIEW OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE IPC NEGOTIATIONS.
2. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE IRAQIS WILL MAKE ANY MOVE IN OUR DIRECTION. WE HAVE EMPHASISED AGAIN TO THE FRENCH THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, REVEAL THAT ANY SOUNDINGS HE MAKES ARE ON OUR BEHALF.
3. YOUR PARA 2. ACTION TAKEN.

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
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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 390 11 MAY/INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT.

SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, KABUL AND ANKARA.

YOURTEL NO. 215: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS. *Day Day have draft* *pad.*

1. AT MY AUDIENCE YESTERDAY WITH THE SHAH HE RAISED THIS MATTER HIMSELF. HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE FOOLISH NOT TO HAVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE. HIS SIX POINT PROPOSALS GAVE THEM PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITIES. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, SAID THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THE FOURTH ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL (EXCHANGING MORE SENIOR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES) BUT HE HAD, HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM THEM. HE HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IRAN WAS DOING ALL SHE COULD TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THE SHAH HAD, HOWEVER, JUST HAD INFORMATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DELIVERING TO IRAQ TWO SQUADRONS OF TU 20 BOMBERS (HE MAY HAVE MEANT TU 22'S), WITH MISSILES OF 100 MILES RANGE. HAD WE CONFIRMATION OF THIS? AND WHAT WAS THE RUSSIANS' PURPOSE? HE HAD TOLD KOSYGIN, WHEN HE WAS HERE IN MARCH THAT HE COULD BLOW THE IRAQIS UP WHENEVER HE WANTED TO. KOSYGIN HAD NOT REACTED BEYOND REITERATING HIS HOPE THAT THERE COULD BE SOME RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

2. I MADE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 TO 3 OF YOURTEL UNDER REFERENCE. ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB PROBLEM THE SHAH SAID IT WAS RIDICULOUS FOR THE IRAQIS TO MAINTAIN THEIR STAND THAT THE WHOLE WATERWAY VIRTUALLY BELONGED TO THEM. HE COULD MAKE A SIMILAR COUNTER-CLAIM, AND THAT WOULD GET THEM NOWHERE. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR DISMAYED BY THE LACK OF RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT ONE DAY A MORE SENSIBLE REGIME MIGHT EMERGE IN BAGHDAD. MEANWHILE, IT WAS NOT HIS OBJECTIVE TO TRY TO HARM THAT COUNTRY.



HE HAD WELCOMED THE IPC SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD HELP THE IRAQI ECONOMY AND, POSSIBLY, ENABLE THE BA'ATHIST REGIME TO ACT IN A MORE CIVILISED WAY. WHEN DEALING WITH WILD MEN, IT SELDOM PAID TO PUT THE SCREWS ON.

3. SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RAMSBOTHAM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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


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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 391 11 MAY/INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI,  
DUBAI, MUSCAT AND JEDDA. SAVING TO TOKYO  
MIPT: (NOT TO ALL).

1. IN A FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES IN THE GULF, I TOLD THE SHAH OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE TO ME ON 28 FEBRUARY (MY LETTER OF 7 MARCH TO WRIGHT). IT SEEMED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED AT THE PROSPECT OF AN AMERICAN ARMS' BUILD-UP IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THAT THEY HAD ALSO REACTED TO THE LARGE ARMS' DEAL BETWEEN THE US. AND IRAN. THE SHAH CONFIRMED THAT KOSYGIN HAD ALSO PRESSED HIM WITH QUESTIONS AS TO WHY HE HAD CONCLUDED A TWO BILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICANS. TO THIS HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE DEAL WAS EVEN LARGER AND THAT HE HAD TO ARM IRAN EFFECTIVELY IN THE FACE OF NEW POTENTIAL THREATS FROM THE EAST AND FROM THE WEST, AND HE HAD CITED THE IRAQI ARMS' SMUGGLING INTO PAKISTAN. KOSYGIN HAD NOT REPLIED.

2. AS REGARDS SOVIET POLICES IN THE GULF, I SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WHAT ROLE THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN PLAYING. I DOUBTED WHETHER THEY HAD INSTIGATED THAT THE IRAQIS IN THEIR MOVE AGAINST KUWAIT, BUT NOR DID I THINK THEY HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO RESTRAIN THEM. THEY WERE PROBABLY ADOPTING THEIR USUAL TACTICS OF SEEING WHETHER THEY COULD EXPLOIT SITUATIONS OF TENSION TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES, WHILE GUARDING AGAINST THE RISK OF EMBARRASSING INVOLVEMENTS. THE SHAH AGREED. IT WAS, HE SAID, HIS

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/ FIRM OBJECTIVE



FIRM OBJECTIVE TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN AT ALL COSTS FOR THE FREE PASSAGE OF SHIPS AND TANKERS. THIS MUST BE, TOO, AN INCREASING INTEREST OF THE WESTERN POWERS AND NOW OF JAPAN.

3. I ASKED ABOUT HIS IDEA OF FORMING SOME DEFENCE COOPERATION AMONGST GULF STATES, IF WHICH I HAD HEARD. I DID NOT MYSELF THINK THERE WOULD BE MUCH FUTURE IN TRYING TO BUILD ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF A DEFENCE PACT BECAUSE OF THE LIKELY DIFFICULTIES WITH, AND AMONGST, THE ARABS. THE SHAH ADMITTED THAT HE HAD PUT THE GENERAL IDEA TO THE SAUDIS BUT THEY DID NOT APPEAR VERY KEEN. THERE WAS ALWAYS, TOO, THE DIFFICULTY WITH IRAQ. BUT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME FUTURE IN TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR A DECLARATION BY GULF STATES THAT THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY OF THE OUTSIDE POWERS TO ACQUIRE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF. WHAT DID I THINK THE RUSSIAN REACTION WOULD BE?

4. I RECALLED THAT BOTH DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND, MORE RECENTLY, KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO IRAN, THE LATTER HAD PRESSED THE SHAH TO INCLUDE IN THE COMMUNIQUE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT BOTH IRAN AND RUSSIA WERE WILLING TO SEE TO IT THAT THE GULF WAS KEPT FREE OF FOREIGN BASES, BUT THAT THE SHAH HAD REJECTED THIS. MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT REALLY FAVOUR THE SORT OF COLLECTIVE DECLARATION HE HAD IN MIND BECAUSE THIS MIGHT FRUSTRATE THEIR HOPES OF EXPLOITING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THEY MIGHT HOWEVER FEEL OBLIGED TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO IT. IN THIS CONNEXION I SAID I, PERSONALLY, DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF, AS I HEARD WAS THE CASE, THE KUWAITIS WERE NOW TO ACQUIRE A HEAVY WEIGHT OF AMERICAN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THE SHAH SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE. HE HAD HEARD THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON PURCHASING A PARTICULAR PLANE, THOUGH THEY SEEMED ATTRACTED BY THE FRENCH MIRAGE.

FCO PASS SAVING TO TOKYO.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 399 OF 12 MAY <sup>1973</sup> INFO TO KUWAIT  
ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT AND JEDDA

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35
NBR 3/324/1

SAVING TO TOKYO

(30) — MY TEL NO 391

(29) — 1. PLEASE ADD FOLLOWING POSTS TO PREAMBLE, AS FOR MY TEL  
NO 390.

RFI SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD,  
CAIRO, KABUL AND ANKARA.

2. PARA 2 LINE 3 DELETE QUOTE THAT UNQUOTE.

3. AMEND WORD IN PARA 3 LINE 1 TO READ QUOTE IDEA UNQUOTE

4. AMEND FOURTH WORD IN PARA 3 LINE 2 TO READ QUOTE  
OF UNQUOTE

FCO PASS SAVING TOKYO

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]


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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 497 OF 13 MAY/INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN  
ROUTINE CAIRO: SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD,  
KABUL, ANKARA.

## IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. AL RA' AL AM AND DAILY NEWS CARRY REPORTS, QUOTING  
"DIPLOMATIC SOURCES HERE", THAT EGYPTIAN MEDIATION, IN  
PARTICULAR ZAYYAT'S VISIT TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD LAST  
MONTH, HAD LED TO A CONSIDERABLE RAPPROCHEMENT OF VIEWS  
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. SADDAM HUSSAIN ALLEGEDLY  
TOLD ZAYYAT THAT IRAQ WAS WILLING TO ESTABLISH GOOD  
NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND ZAYYAT HAD BEEN ABLE  
TO PERSUADE THE TWO SIDES TO CONDUCT SECRET NEGOTIATIONS.  
A SECRET MEETING HAD RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN SWITZERLAND  
BETWEEN THE IRAQI AND IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HAD  
BEEN ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 418 OF 15 MAY/INFO KUWAIT , CAIRO

(32)

KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 497: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

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16 MAY 1973  
NBR 3/324/

1. I SUSPECT THAT THIS LEAK ABOUT THE  
SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IRAQI AND  
IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS DERIVED FROM  
REPORTS BY MY KUWAITI COLLEAGUE WHO TOLD ME  
THAT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ALSO  
INFORMED HIM ABOUT THESE NEGOTIATION.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 390 11 MAY/INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT.

SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, KABUL AND ANKARA.

YOURTEL NO. 215: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. AT MY AUDIENCE YESTERDAY WITH THE SHAH HE RAISED THIS MATTER HIMSELF. HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE FOOLISH NOT TO HAVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE. HIS SIX POINT PROPOSALS GAVE THEM PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITIES. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, SAID THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THE FOURTH ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL (EXCHANGING MORE SENIOR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES) BUT HE HAD, HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM THEM. HE HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IRAN WAS DOING ALL SHE COULD TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THE SHAH HAD, HOWEVER, JUST HAD INFORMATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DELIVERING TO IRAQ TWO SQUADRONS OF TU 20 BOMBERS (HE MAY HAVE MEANT TU 22'S), WITH MISSILES OF 100 MILES RANGE. HAD WE CONFIRMATION OF THIS? AND WHAT WAS THE RUSSIANS' PURPOSE? HE HAD TOLD KOSYGIN, WHEN HE WAS HERE IN MARCH THAT HE COULD BLOW THE IRAQIS UP WHENEVER HE WANTED TO. KOSYGIN HAD NOT REACTED BEYOND REITERATING HIS HOPE THAT THERE COULD BE SOME RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

2. I MADE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 TO 3 OF YOURTEL UNDER REFERENCE. ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB PROBLEM THE SHAH SAID IT WAS RIDICULOUS FOR THE IRAQIS TO MAINTAIN THEIR STAND THAT THE WHOLE WATERWAY VIRTUALLY BELONGED TO THEM. HE COULD MAKE A SIMILAR COUNTER-CLAIM, AND THAT WOULD GET THEM NOWHERE. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR DISMAYED BY THE LACK OF RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT ONE DAY A MORE SENSIBLE REGIME MIGHT EMERGE IN BAGHDAD. MEANWHILE, IT WAS NOT HIS OBJECTIVE TO TRY TO HARM THAT COUNTRY.

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/ HE HAD



HE HAD WELCOMED THE IPC SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD HELP THE IRAQI ECONOMY AND, POSSIBLY, ENABLE THE BA'ATHIST REGIME TO ACT IN A MORE CIVILISED WAY. WHEN DEALING WITH WILD MEN, IT SELDOM PAID TO PUT THE SCREWS ON.

3. SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TEL NO 242 OF 17 MAY/INFO SAVING MOSCOW,

WASHINGTON, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, KABUL, ANKARA AND KUWAIT.

YOUR TEL NO 390: IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE SHAH'S REPORT THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE DELIVERING TU 22 BOMBERS TO IRAQ. WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE INTERESTED IN ANY FURTHER DETAILS HE CAN PROVIDE. WE SHALL NATURALLY LET YOU KNOW IF WE RECEIVE ANY INFORMATION.

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36 Transferred to Persian Gulf General.



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BRITISH EMBASSY

PARIS

28 May 1973

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- 4 JUN 1973

NBR 5/324/1

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There has now been a  
telm from Tehran

P H G Wright Esq  
Middle East Department

Dear Patricia.

IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. Commines (Directeur du Levant) told Martin Le Quesne last week that the French had received a report from their Ambassador in Baghdad suggesting that the Iraqis had reached a preliminary understanding with the Iranians about Shatt-al Arab. According to the French Ambassador, the Iraqis had accepted that the frontier at Shatt-al Arab should run along the middle of the river bed. Martin Le Quesne expressed surprise, pointing out that this would involve the abandonment by the Iraqis of the position they have taken ever since 1932.

2. The French are aware that Khalatbari's meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva (Tehran telegram No 363 to you) did not yield any immediate results. But they do believe there have been further contacts since that meeting in which some progress was made, and that Soviet pressure on the Iraqis has been a factor in this.

3. The Quai tell us that the Iraqi Government's relations with the Kurds remain strained as the Kurds are continuing to demand the establishment of a separate Kurdish legislative assembly and executive council.

4. So far as cooperation between <sup>the</sup> Ba'ath and the Communists is concerned (your telegram No 429), the Quai say that there is, of course, already a large measure of cooperation between them, and the Communists have accepted the national "charter" and programme of action. They are not aware of any significant new developments.

Tom. am.

Relin.

R W Renwick

Copied to:

H J Arbuthnott Esq  
Tehran

Chanceries Moscow  
Beirut

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 403 OF 31 MAY. 1973  
INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD,

SAVING TO BEIRUT.

pal

(19) MY TEL NO 333. (NOT TO ALL) IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS HEARD FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ THAT AN IRANIAN DELEGATION HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING IN BAGHDAD FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS AND MAKING GOOD PROGRESS. SOUSA (MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE) THINKS THE DELEGATION IS PROBABLY LED BY FARTASH, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AS HE IS SAID TO BE ABSENT FROM TEHRAN FOR A MEDICAL CHECK-UP. (AFTER KHALATBARI'S SIMILAR COVER STORY, THIS IS TAKEN AS A EUPHEMISM FOR SECRET NEGOTIATIONS ABROAD).

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ BELIEVES THAT THE IRAQIS ARE READY TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE IRANIANS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON A MEDIAN NAVIGATION LINE IN THE SHATT-AL-ARAB AND ALSO, MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE IRAQIS, SOME SORT OF ACCOMMODATION OVER THE KURDS.

2. IF THIS REPORT IS ACCURATE - AND DE SOUSA SPOKE HIGHLY OF THE PROFICIENCY OF HIS COLLEAGUE IN BAGHDAD - A NEW INITIATIVE MUST HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO RESUME CONTACT FOLLOWING THE APPARENT FAILURE OF KHALATBARI'S SECRET VISIT TO BAGHDAD. WITH THE SHAH, KHALATBARI AND ALAM AWAY, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO OBTAIN FIRM CONFIRMATION HERE FOR THIS REPORT. UNLESS SOME PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE, WE MAY HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL YOU SEE KHALATBARI AND THE SHAH ON THE 9TH JUNE.

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3. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE, I HAVE HEARD SIMILAR REPORTS OF POSSIBLE FURTHER IRAN-IRAQ CONTACTS FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY SOURCES. THE LATTER TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN THEY ASKED HIM ABOUT THESE RUMOURS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, GOOD EVIDENCE (SENATOR MASSOUDI) THAT AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REACHED TO TONE DOWN THE RADIO WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR FOUR DAYS FROM ABOUT 29 MAY, APPARENTLY AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS RECONCILIATION.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEE.

RAMSBOTHAM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MR. PARSONS

MR. LE QUESNE

SIR G. ARTHUR

MR. ROSE

PS

PS/FUS

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 - 4 JUN 1973 NBR 3/3241
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Mr Smith

Mr Burton


Mr Hunt

IRAN/IRAQ

1. During the course of a conversation this morning with Mr Mohamed Al-Saleh of the Kuwait Embassy, he asked me whether we had any information about recent contacts between Iran and Iraq.

2. I said that we had heard that contacts had taken place but had no details beyond the fact that little substantive progress appeared to have been made towards a rapprochement between the two countries. Mr Al-Saleh said that the main stumbling block appeared to be an Iraqi demand for Iranian withdrawal from the Gulf Islands. In answer to a question about the Soviet rôle in these discussions, I said that it was probably a source of embarrassment to the Russians if the Iraqis (with whom they were in Treaty relations) remained on bad terms with Iran, since the Russians were endeavouring to maintain good relations with both bilaterally. We did not however have any information about the extent of Soviet pressure on either party.

3. I did not refer to the latest talks in Baghdad reported in Tehran telno 483 of 31 May. I do not know whether the Kuwaitis are still being kept informed (see Tehran tel no 418).

  
P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

1 June 1973

Cc:-

Chanceries at:-  
Tehran  
Kuwait




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38

1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 504 OF 7 JUNE/INFO WASHINGTON,  
MOSCOW, PARIS, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD.

SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MY TEL NO 483 IRAN/IRAQ

1. I ASKED THE MINISTER OF COURT THIS MORNING  
WHETHER THE REPORTS WERE TRUE OF RESUMED  
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. ALAM  
CATEGORICALLY DENIED THIS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO  
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE  
TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS MET IN GENEVA. ALAM DID,  
HOWEVER, CONFIRM THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT  
HAD AGREED WITH THE IRAQIS TO MODIFY THEIR  
RESPECTIVE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS, AT LEAST  
FOR A TEST PERIOD.

2. I HAVE INFORMED MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE OF THIS  
STRONG DENIAL OF THE STORY FROM BAGHDAD (AND,  
COMING FROM ALAM, I ACCEPT IT), AND HE WILL NOW  
TRY TO ASCERTAIN ON WHAT IT WAS BASED.

*Handwritten:* 4/7  
MSB  
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FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEE

RAMSBOTHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SIR G ARTHUR  
MR PARSONS  
MR LEQUESNE  
MR ROSE

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Q. What has led to the conflict between the Iran and Iraq governments? (41)  
When did this conflict begin? What is the attitude of the UN towards it?

4AP

The immediate cause of the present conflict between Persia and 'Iraq is a long-standing disagreement over their common frontier on the Shatt al Arab.

Before 1914 Ottoman Turkey allowed Britain special rights and responsibilities in the Shatt and it suited Britain to have it under Turkish sovereignty. The frontier was accordingly drawn in 1913/4 on the Persian side of the channel, instead of down the middle as would be normal, and thus put the whole waterway inside Turkish - now 'Iraqi - territory.

Although the then Persian government accepted this, it was later deeply resented. Persia delayed recognising 'Iraq till 1929: an agreement of 1937 only modified the frontier around Abadan, but gave Persia full freedom of navigation in the Shatt for both merchant and naval ships.

On April 19 1969 Persia precipitately ended this colonial relic by denouncing the 1937 agreement although it lacked provision for denunciation. The two parties have been at legal loggerheads ever since.

But the conflict has deeper roots. Apart from the traditional enmity between Persian and Arab, special difficulties separate Persia and 'Iraq. Although modern 'Iraq has always been dominated by Sunnis, it contains sacred Shia shrines and a large Shia population including many Persians, who became innocent victims of the conflict when the 'Iraqi government in 1969 started expelling them with little ceremony or consideration. By December 1971 the Persian government estimated that 100,000 refugees had been so expelled since 1969.

The two governments also have profoundly different ideologies. Since 1958 'Iraq has usually been under doctrinaire left-wing governments proclaiming support for anti-monarchical revolution everywhere, while the Shah has strengthened the monarchy, and indeed the power and prestige, of Persia. Reciprocal accusations of interference in internal affairs have been exchanged, the 'Iraqi Iraq government accusing the Persian of instigating attempts to overthrow it, while the Persians claim to have caught armed 'Iraqi saboteurs on Persian territory. In 1970 Persian aircraft were three times hijacked to 'Iraq.

Kurdistan is also a big problem. As there are many Kurds in both



countries, the war in 'Iraqi Kurdistan tended to draw in Persia. She has, not very convincingly, denied military involvement, but in December 1971 her Foreign Minister threatened that if 'Iraq started open hostilities against Persia, the latter would be able to give military help to the Kurds, as they had already given "humanitarian" aid.

Finally there is the future of the Gulf now the British have left. In October 1970 the Shah stated that he would not allow the establishment in the Gulf of any other foreign power (he no doubt suspects 'Iraq of acting there for her Russian ally) and that he would strengthen his forces to ensure full freedom for Persia's vital sea communications and oil exports. Persia has since vastly increased the fire power of her armed forces. 'Iraq also seeks predominance in the Gulf and denounces Persian ambitions there, her government press has claimed that she cannot spare more troops for the Israel front because of the Persian threat, and she is building a big military base at Umm Qasr near Basra. Both governments have been wooing the newly independent states of the Gulf.

All this explains why the conflict, with its bloody border clashes, has proved so hard to resolve. The UN is involved insofar as the Persian government has complained to the Human Rights Commission about the maltreatment of Persians in N. 'Iraq and the 'Iraqis to the Security Council about alleged Persian violations of 'Iraqi sovereignty, which Persia denies, countercharging that 'Iraq has promoted subversion in Persia. These latter charges gained force from the recent discovery in the 'Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan of arms apparently intended for distribution to potential rebels in Persian Baluchistan: 'Iraq had already allowed such Baluchis to establish an office in Baghdad. You encourage my Kurds, I'll encourage your Baluchis.....

So far mediation by Turkey and Jordan, and repeated offers of negotiation by Persia, have failed. An unconfirmed report says that the Soviet government, anxious to preserve its existing good relations with both Persia and 'Iraq, recently promoted a secret meeting between the Persian and 'Iraqi Foreign Ministers in Geneva.



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Finally there is the future of the Gulf now the British have left.

'Iraq also seeks predominance in the Gulf.



ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

BAGHDAD

NR/324/1

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 12 July 1973

NR

Dear Graham

SADDAM HUSSEIN

Three pressmen, Gavin Young (Observer), Eric Rouleau (Le Monde) and Juan de Lois (New York Times), spent four hours with Saddam Hussein yesterday evening (11 July). Saddam Hussein was calm, authoritative and un-pompous. He is an intense man, without great deal of humour - confident and unruffled. Khalis Azme (Ministry of Information) made the final arrangements for their call. (Azme known to us through his part in registering the British Council under the new cultural law)

2. Mr Young was kind enough to give me this afternoon some points from their interview, which he and his colleagues intend to publish in the next few days. Each story will presumably be angled towards Iraq's relations with each journalist's country. Saddam also asked the correspondents for their views and comments on Iraq. I gather these were given on a "no holds barred" basis.

3. FOREIGN POLICY

Saddam said that Iraq's foreign policy was based on two central principles:

- a) Trade and diplomatic relations with regions of the world of differing (political) natures.
- b) Mutual respect of each country for the other. He had found US policy, and to a lesser extent British, hostile.

But he would never close the doors in the face of any positive development which occurs in these policies and concerning which relations might change for the better. If there is any positive change, he said, we will be the first to proclaim it loudly and positively to our own people. There are great new developments in the world today. There is no winning party and no losing party (in bilateral relations). Relations are between two gainers, like a buyer and a seller. There is room for a re-study (of Anglo-Iraqi relations). But Iraqis intend to be masters in their own country without outside interference, from wherever it may come (implying USSR, apparently) Iraq would build itself in a completely independent manner, and remain neutral in international conflict.

4. IRAN

Naturally, Iraq was concerned with any abnormal surplus armaments beyond the boundaries of what was needed for self-defence. Such surpluses gave rise to worries about the purposes of such armament. Following the occupation of the three islands in the Gulf, and the unilateral abrogation of the treaty of 1937 (Shatt el Arab) there was little doubt that Iranian



# ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

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Date

intentions were aggressive. Iran should withdraw from the islands, or come to some agreement with the Emirates about sovereignty.

## 5. INTERNAL

I did not discuss with Young the now boring details of the recent plot, though he told me Saddam had explained and expanded the published story, and was convinced of Khaliq as-Sammara'ie's complicity. More importantly he talked of future plans.

The watchword is 'democratisation' - with the aim of achieving a 'healthy consensus' in government. The National Action Charter is to be brought into being. There will be a Council of Ministers meeting regularly under President Bakr, which will issue decrees in its own name. But there will be no power sharing in the RCC (all Baathis) or the Army. Nevertheless participation will come about in every other aspect of life in Iraq. A parliament will be set up in which all political movements will be represented.

6. Towards this goal, the Baath have reached agreement with the Communist Party in Iraq on the National Action Charter. Details will be announced shortly, about 17 July.

Negotiations with the Kurds on this and other matters are at an advanced stage. The Kurds will achieve self government in March 1974, and amendments to the existing agreement will be allowed provided they are related to Kurdish matters and do not affect the wider progress of Iraq.

## 7. BRITAIN

In addition to paragraph 3 above, Saddam said, in answer to Mr Young's questions, that he did not think Britain was supporting the Kurds through Iran; and he was amused when Young mentioned the souq rumour that the British were guiding the Baath. "Would they (the party) be doing what they are doing today?" he quipped. Tackled about Shadhil Taqa's (MFA Under Secretary) assertion to Young three weeks ago that Sir Alec Douglas-Home's presence in Teheran was a hostile act, he said that minor officials tend to exaggerate.

A relationship with Britain more akin to that which existed with France would be welcome.

*Yours ever*

*Im*

I McCluney



GRS 580

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FM TEHRAN 091000Z

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 11 OCT 1973 NBR 3/324/1.
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 734 OF 09 OCT, 1973  
INFO BAGHDAD,

SAVING TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT,  
JEDDA, WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS,  
MOSCOW.

AB 12/1 x  
pe

#### IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNIQUE  
ISSUED YESTERDAY:- " IN RESPECT OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE IRAQI  
GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  
WITH THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED  
TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE LOOKING AFTER IRANIAN INTERESTS  
IN IRAQ BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY  
AT 3 P.M. ON SUNDAY 7 OCTOBER , TOGETHER WITH THE INTENTION  
OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO SEND A DELEGATION TO DISCUSS  
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND WHICH WAS BROADCAST BY BAGHDAD  
RADIO AT 3.15 P.M., THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF LOOKING AFTER  
IRAQI INTERESTS IN IRAN HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT, SINCE  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE WERE BROKEN OFF BY  
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, AND NOW THAT THAT GOVERNMENT  
HAS SHOWN AN INCLINATION TO RESTORE POLITICAL RELATIONS  
WITH IRAN, THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ACCEPTS THE IRAQI  
PROPOSAL ON THE RENEWAL OF THESE TIES. BUT AT THE SAME  
TIME, CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES,  
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE  
READY TO SOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE UNIVERSALLY  
RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND ON JUSTICE AND EQUITY,  
PROVIDED THAT SUCH SETTLEMENT OBLITERATES THE REMAINING  
LEGACIES OF BRITISH COLONIALISM AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
THE PRESENT DAY SPIRIT."

/ 2. ACCORDING



2. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN, ELABORATING ON THE COMMUNIQUE, ALSO REITERATED THAT, SINCE SOME OF THE IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE 1937 AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ FOR A PERIOD OF 32 YEARS; AND SINCE ALL IRANIAN EFFORTS TO COMPEL THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL ITS COMMITMENTS RESULTING FROM THIS AGREEMENT REMAINED FRUITLESS; AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS IMPERIALISTIC IN NATURE AND CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER AS WELL AS IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ANNULLED THE AGREEMENT IN 1969 AND AT THE SAME TIME ANNOUNCED THAT IRAN WAS PREPARED TO SOLVE ITS FRONTIER DIFFERENCES WITH IRAQ ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

3. INFORMED SOURCES WERE ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE EXPECTED TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND AFTER THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES HAD BEEN FULLY RE-ACTIVATED. AS FOR TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THE SOURCES SAID THAT NO CONCRETE DECISION HAD SO FAR BEEN TAKEN BUT THAT PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WERE EXPECTED SOON.

4. EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN CAUTIOUS. THE TEHRAN JOURNAL, WHILST WELCOMING THE IRAQI MOVE, POINTS TO THE CAUSE OF STRAINED RELATIONS IN THE PAST, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY IRAQ'S EXPULSION OF IRANIAN NATIONALS. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL SAYS THAT IRAN AND IRAQ, WHETHER THEY LIKE EACH OTHER OR NOT, ARE NEIGHBOURS AND HAVE TO LIVE TOGETHER AND THAT IT IS ONLY REASONABLE THAT THEY

/ SHOULD AT



SHOULD AT LEAST MAINTAIN NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.  
UNDUE OPTIMISM WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE JUSTIFIED AND ALL  
ONE CAN DO AT THE MOMENT 'IS TO WAIT AND HOPE FOR A GENUINE  
THAW TO MATERIALIZE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

RAMSBOTHAM.

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FM TEHRAN 091000Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 735 OF 09 OCTOBER.

SAVING TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,  
MUSCAT, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,  
WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW.

13

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THERE HAVE BEEN NO LOCAL INDICATIONS THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS LIKELY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SHAH TOLD LORD CARRINGTON LAST WEEK THAT HE COULD SEE NO SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQ AND WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE INCREASING SOVIET BUILD-UP THERE (MY TELNO 712); AND EARLIER IN THE WEEK THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY THAT, ALTHOUGH IRAN WAS ALWAYS READY TO TALK WITH THE IRAQIS, THERE WAS NO SIGN OF THE LATTER BEING READY FOR DISCUSSIONS.

I FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE SHAH OR MIRFENDERESKI WAS AT THAT TIME CONCEALING ANYTHING.

2. LOCAL PRESS SPECULATION HAS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATIONS OF IRAQ'S MOTIVES:-

X A. THAT IRAQ TOOK THIS INITIATIVE IN THE HOPE OF ENCOUNTERING A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM IRAN WHICH WOULD HAVE HELPED IRAQ TO JUSTIFY A POLICY OF INACTION AGAINST ISRAEL " BECAUSE OF IRANIAN HOSTILITY";

✓ B. THAT IRAQ WAS WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEND FENCES WITHOUT LOSING FACE. THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT PROVIDED SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY;

✓ C. THAT IRAQ HAD COME TO REALIZE THAT BAD RELATIONS WITH IRAN COULD ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO ITS OWN ISOLATION COMBINED WITH CONTINUOUS DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.



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✓ C. THAT IRAQ HAD COME TO REALIZE THAT BAD RELATIONS WITH IRAN COULD ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO ITS OWN ISOLATION COMBINED WITH CONTINUOUS DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.

3. THE FRENCH EMBASSY VIEW, POSSIBLY BASED ON REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD, IS THAT THE IRAQIS BY SEEKING A RAPPROCHEMENT AT THIS MOMENT WITH IRAN ARE TRYING TO MANOEUVRE THE LATTER INTO A POSITION IN WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE LINE AGAINST ISRAEL.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT TO COMMENT ON IRAQI MOTIVES FROM HERE. MY OWN HUNCH IS THAT THE RUSSIANS, FOR WHOM IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITY HAS BEEN A GROWING EMBARRASSMENT, MAY HAVE PRESSURIZED THE FORMER INTO TAKING AN INITIATIVE. THERE COULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE SOME TRUTH IN THE FRENCH EMBASSY VIEW AND ALSO IN THE EXPLANATIONS OFFERED IN 2B AND 2C ABOVE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RAMSBOTHAM.

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LLC NR 520/09  
PP FCO  
GRS 200

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FM TEHRAN 091245Z  
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GYPH

Mr. Le Chesne  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. M.R.

Mr. Butler 10/11

(Date)

NBR 3/324/1.

Attaching Top Copy.

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 739 OF 09 OCT.  
SAVING TO BEIRUT, PARIS, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, JEDDA,  
ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, PARIS,  
MOSCOW, BAHRAIN, DOHA.

MY TELNO 735

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THIS WITH  
THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER WHEN I TOOK THE SPEAKER OF  
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO CALL ON HIM.

WSB 12/11  
pa

2. HOVEYDA SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL EVALUATING THE IRAQI  
MOTIVES. NO CLEAR CONCLUSIONS HAD SO FAR EMERGED,  
BUT THEY WERE INCLINED TO FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS,  
WHOSE SHORT-TERM INTERESTS DID NOT FAVOUR THE CONTINUANCE  
OF THE IRAN/IRAQ FEUD, HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN PERSUADING THE  
IRAQIS TO MEND THEIR FENCES WITH IRAN. HOVEYDA ALSO  
MENTIONED, BUT ONLY TO DISMISS IT, THE THEORY THAT THE IRAQIS  
HAD BEEN COURTING A REBUFF (PARA 2(A) OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER  
REFERENCE).

3. HOVEYDA ALSO SPECULATED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT HOPE THAT  
BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAN WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM  
TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH THE KURDS.

4. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT H.M.G. WOULD WELCOME THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.  
A BETTER ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO COULD BE AN  
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN  
GULF.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RAMSBOTHAM.



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FM TEHRAN 110500Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 745 OF 10 OCTOBER/AND SAVING TO  
BEIRUT, PARIS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT,  
DAMSCUS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN AND DOHA.

MYTEL NO 739 : IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

NBR 3/324/1.

1. AT THE SPEAKER'S AUDIENCE THIS MORNING, WE ASKED THE  
SHAH HOW HE INTERPRETED THE IRAQI MOVE FOR RENEWAL  
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND OFFER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING  
DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN.

2. THE SHAH SAID HE THOUGHT THE PRIMARY MOTIVE BEHIND  
THE MOVE WAS THE KURDISH PROBLEM .  
THE IRAQIS WERE UNDER INCREASING SOVIET PRESSURE TO BRING ABOUT  
THE COALITION BETWEEN THE BA'TH, THE COMMUNISTS, AND THE  
KURDS. THE IRAQIS RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD NOT COME ABOUT  
SO LONG AS THE SHAH RETAINED THE KURDISH CARD IN HIS HAND,  
AND WERE SEEKING TO WEAKEN IT BY THIS MOVE. BUT HE HAD EVERY  
INTENTION OF KEEPING IT THERE. HE HAD, OF COURSE, ACCEPTED  
THE REQUEST TO RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WAS PREPARED  
TO SEE WHAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT OFFER TOWARDS RESOLVING  
THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES. THE TEST HERE WAS THE SHATT-AL-  
ARAB WHERE IRAN'S POSITION WAS CLEAR AND FIRM.

3. I REPEATED, WHAT I HAD SAID TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT  
HMG WOULD WELCOME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN  
IRAN AND IRAQ.

RAMSBOTHAM.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.

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NAID.

WED.

DEF.D.

EN.D.

STD.

NEWSD.

RESEARCHD. (SOVIET SECT.)

RESEARCHD. (MI. SECTION.)

RESEARCHD. (WE. SECTION.)

CONFIDENTIAL.



## ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

BAGHDAD

NBR 3/324/1  
48'5/10

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London.

Your reference

Our reference

Date

8th October, 1973.

Dear Graham,

## IRAQ - IRAN: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The RCC decided on 7 October to resume diplomatic relations with Iran as a gesture of willingness to settle problems between the two countries. Iraq is willing to send a delegation to Iran which would negotiate in such a way as to secure the interests rights and sovereignty of both Islamic neighbours. I enclose the press cutting reporting this.

2. This RCC decision, taken on a day when the Arab-Israeli war was at its height, and following within a few hours the nationalisation of US interests in the Basrah Petroleum Company, was quite unexpected. I believe it is also unrelated to the hostilities on Israel's borders. The most important problem for the Baath in Iraq is the promised Kurdish autonomy on 11 March, 1974 and a number of the ideas they have had for settling this have already run into the ground. In opening a dialogue with Iran they might hope to reduce Iranian support for the Kurds in those areas outside the control of the central government, and make it easier to implement their plans to keep the Kurdish state subordinate to the laws of Iraq as a whole.

3. This public announcement may also place the Iranians in the unfortunate position of having to reply more positively than they have done hitherto in private. The Iraqi appeal to Arab countries and sisterly Islamic countries to encourage the Iranians to respond quickly is an open request for Saudi and more particularly Pakistani support. The new Pakistani Ambassador arrived here a month ago, so fences there following the <sup>arms</sup> cache incident, have been repaired. The appeal to other friendly countries must be taken to imply the Russians; it is too far-fetched to imagine they mean us.

Yours ever,  
la

I McCluney

c.c. Chancery  
Tehran



RESTRICTD

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Royal Swedish Embassy  
British Interests Section  
Baghdad

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 OCT 1973 NBR 3/324
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G S Burton Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London.

Your reference

Our reference

Date

11th October, 1973

*Dear Graham,*

IRAQ - IRAN: RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

*13/11  
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pa*

The Iraqi decision to resume relations with Iran is seen here as necessary internally. It was fortuitous that the Israeli war provided a smoke screen of muslim unity through which this act would pass unnoticed.

2. For Iraq the resumption will mean negotiations over the Shatt el Arab, but they may gain help from the Iranians in the North. To achieve Kurdish autonomy the Baath need to isolate Barazani and the KDP in their mountain strongholds and will try to persuade Iran to make the border there more meaningful.

3. The party and the Government have been weakened during the summer by attempts to reach a accomodation with the Kurds, and if the Baath are to impose their brand of autonomy they will need to be assured of some measure of Iranian disinterest in the Kurdish areas. For this they may be willing to legalise the working arrangements already existing in the Shatt.

*Yours ever*

*la*

I McCluney

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RC .I Swedish Embassy  
British Interests Section  
Baghdad

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 OCT 1973 NBR 1/2
---

G S Burton Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London.

Your reference

Our reference

Date

copied at NBR 3/324/1

16th October, 1973.

*For Graham*

There has been an interesting leader in Al-Thawra entitled "How Did Iraq Get Into The Battle?".

2. The article deals in some detail with the re-opening of diplomatic relations with Iran, and it is refreshing to find our own thoughts about the internal situation here confirmed in a Government newspaper. If this candour continues the Iraq public may begin to learn again the real meaning of the word truth.

*Yours ever*

*lan*

I McCluney.

c.c. Tehran

c.c. Kuwait

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Iran/Iran relations  
24/x  
18/11/73  
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"HOW DID IRAQ GET INTO THE BATTLE?" - AL-THAWRA 11/12 OCTOBER

Begins:

Iraqs participation in the battle is not a national duty as no Iraqi territory is under occupation. But two central facts are important:

Iraq has been, since 1948, fighting against the Zionist enemy.

Secondly, Iraq is now led by a nationalist party, which was the first to conceive of the unity of Arab struggle. Iraq must stand in the front ranks of the battle.

2. Answering the question "How did Iraq give expression to this attitude?" Al-Thawra draws attention to the use of oil as a weapon. Following the nationalisation of IPC 1st June, 1972 Iraq put forward early this year 1973 a plan for the employment of oil as a political weapon if that plan received the consent of Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Resistance Movement. The plan was shelved, but at the beginning of the current war Iraq's revolutionary regime proceeded to nationalise Americas interests in the Basra Petroleum Company, thus opening a hot political battle against the imperialist enemy. The struggle against America should be conducted by means other than speech making and the issuing of resolutions. What ought to be done by the arab oil producing countries is to nationalise Americas share and stop the flow of arab oil to America as Iraq has already done. The Arab nation rejects in advance the kind of theatrical attitudes assumed in 1956 and 1967 which smacked of hypocrisy and deceit. The masses should compel Governments to submit to the public will if they default in this respect.

3. After Iraq had opened the political front by nationalising the American oil interests it immediately proceeded to contribute to the fighting front, although the outbreak of war had come as a surprise. As soon as Iraq knew of the fighting over the radio Iraqi planes joined the battle on the western front, where they had been stationed for several months. On the morning of the second day of fighting, Iraqi planes were pouring onto the northern front. But the fighting did not stop, and headquarters decided that Iraqi land forces be committed to the battle on a large scale. In facing this decision there were the following problems;

- a. Iraqs relations with Iran had been deteriorating for many years. Iraq was therefore compelled to place a considerable part of its forces along her eastern frontiers. When hostilities broke out on October 6 Iraq sent reserve land forces to the battle front in a token gesture.
- b. Iraq has never harboured aggressive designs towards Iran but the character of Irans relations with America on the one hand and Irans policy towards Iraq and the Arab Gulf on the other have stood in the way of peace over the years. All efforts by Iraq to come to terms with Iran have failed including the direct meetings in Geneva in April 1973 between Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Iran. Thus the decision (to renew relations) announced by the RCC on October 7 had one basic and direct motive namely to free Iraqs military power for the nationalist battle. We emphasise that the decision was by no means a

/political



political expediency which could change with a change of circumstances.

- c. It is public knowledge that Iraq is the only one among the confrontation countries to have a serious internal security problem on its lap, namely, the problem arising from the conditions on the northern part of the country, for all the efforts exerted in the way of peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue we still cannot, for reasons outside the control of the national forces of both Arabs and Kurds, shut our eyes to this (internal security) problem or underestimate the perils imposed to the national unity of Iraq.
- d. In spite of the considerations raised by these points, a courageous decision was made to commit Iraq's land forces to the battle. To put that decision into effect considerable (logistical) difficulties had to be surmounted, the army had to move across enormous distances, The enemy did try to attack our moving columns in the night of 9/10 October, but the attempt was foiled.

There are many other facts concerning Iraq's participation in the battle which will be disclosed when the proper time arrives.

Ends.



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
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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 780 OF 20 OCTOBER, 1973  
INFO BONN, BERLIN, MOSCOW.



NBR 3/324/1

1. THE SHAH TOLD ME THE OTHER DAY WHEN WE HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT IRAN'S RECENT RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, THAT HE HAD HAD TO THREATEN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN EAST BERLIN WITH A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, WHICH HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. THE SHAH EXPLAINED THAT THE EAST BERLIN RADIO, WHICH WAS GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED, HAD IN RECENT BROADCASTS REFERRED TO THE VIEWS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY OF IRAN ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY. HE HAD REACTED SHARPLY, SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO THE EFFECT THAT ANY FURTHER SUCH REFERENCES TO THE TUDEH PARTY, WHICH DID NOT EXIST IN IRAN, WOULD CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE BREAKING-OFF OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THIS WAS, THE SHAH SAID, THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE IRAN'S POSITION CLEAR TO THESE PEOPLE.

3. WITH A SARDONIC SMILE, AND A DEGREE OF RELISH, THE SHAH ADDED THAT HIS MESSAGE HAD CAUSED SOME CONSTERNATION IN EAST BERLIN.

RAMSBOTHAM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

PS

MED

P/S LORD BALNIEL

WED

P/S PUS

LEES

MR LEQUESNE

IRD

MR PARSONS

PUS

SIR T BRIMELON

NEWS

MR WIGGIN

GIPD

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IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. I called today on Mr Parviz Parvizian, Assistant Head of the 1st Political Department, to ask him about the present state of Iran/Iraq relations.

2. Parvizian said that progress still awaited the arrival of respective Ambassadors. The Shah had give agreement for the appointment of Joma'ah to Tehran and the Iraqis had agreed to the Iranian nominee, Shahidzadeh. But Shahidzadeh was not going to move until Joma'ah arrived in Tehran.

3. Parvizian said that once the exchange had been achieved they were expecting ~~the~~ Iraqi delegation to come to Tehran to discuss all existing problems. The Iraqis had agreed to send such a delegation at the time of the resumption of relations and the Iranians had heard nothing to suggest that the Iraqis had changed their mind.


4. There had been no relapse yet in the spirit of rapprochement. The Iraqis had been careful to avoid any border incidents and had also put a stop to hostile propaganda. The Iranians had naturally reciprocated.

5. Parvizian said that Iraqi politics seemed relatively stable. There had been fighting between the communists and the Kurds (which was reported in the newspapers here) but a truce had now been signed between the two parties.

27 November 1973

N W Browne

cc: P K Williams Esq, MED



The Iranian Embassy  
told us he was already  
in Tehran.

WR Burton sf s/k  
pc

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


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1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 898 OF 5 DEC RPTD FOR INFO TO  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE ABU DHABI DUBAI BAHRAIN DOHA  
MUSCAT JEDDA AND KUWAIT.

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS REPORTS AN MFA SPOKESMAN AS SAYING  
THAT THE IRAQI EMBASSY HAD ON 17 NOVEMBER SENT A NOTE TO  
THE MFA PROTESTING AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF FOUR IRANIAN  
FRIGATES AT KHORALMAYEH (SIC) ON 9 SEPTEMBER. IT HAD ALSO  
MENTIONED THAT ONE OF THE FRIGATES (WHICH WAS FULLY ARMED)  
PASSED 'AL-MOHAMMAREH' (THE FORMER ARAB NAME FOR KHORRAMSHAHR)  
ON 18 SEPTEMBER, MOVING TOWARDS 'AL-AHWAZ'  
(THE ARABIC VERSION OF AHWAZ) AND THAT A SECOND ARMED  
FRIGATE HAD TAKEN THE SAME ROUTE. SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE NOTE  
ALLEGED THAT IRAN WAS INVOLVED IN 'ILLEGAL TRESPASSING'.  
THE NOTE HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON  
4 DECEMBER.

2. THE SPOKESMAN ALSO REFERRED TO VARIOUS RECENT IRAQI  
BROADCASTS, BOTH RADIO AND TELEVISION AND PRESS ARTICLES  
, WHICH HAD ARAB NAMES FOR IRANIAN TOWNS AND PROVINCES : HAD  
ATTACKED THE ARAB SHEIKH'S FAILURE TO RESIST IRANIAN  
OCCUPATION OF THE THREE ISLANDS AND HAD ACCUSED IRAN OF BEING  
AN ENEMY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND OF OPPOSING IRAQI OIL  
NATIONALISATION.



3. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT IRAN HAD OBSERVED THESE ATTACKS WITH MUCH REGRET, IN VIEW OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE DECISION TO RE-ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TAKE UP ANY OFFICIAL POSITION YET.

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
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1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 899 OF 5 DECEMBER/ INFO  
BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT,  
JEDDA, KUWAIT.

MYTELNO 898 IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS



1. CHIEF OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT  
ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY TO CALL TODAY.

2. NADIM SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM  
TO INFORM US AND OTHER FRIENDLY EMBASSIES OF THE IRAQI  
NOTE OF 17 NOVEMBER AND THE RELATED ATTACKS ON IRAN IN THE  
IRAQI MEDIA. NOW, HE SAID, IT HAD ALL APPEARED IN THE  
PRESS (IT SEEMS THAT THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A MISTAKE).

HE COULD, HOWEVER, ADD THAT THE IRAQI NOTE HAD PROTESTED  
AGAINST IRANIAN "AGGRESSION" IN SENDING FRIGATES TO THE  
SHATT-AL-ARAB. THIS WAS STRONG LANGUAGE.

3. THE IRANIANS DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF THES ATTACKS.  
PERHAPS THEY WERE A PRELUDE TO A NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE

KURDS. ARBUTHNOTT ASKED WHETHER IT COULD BE CONNECTED  
WITH THE FORTHCOMING VISIT BY AN IRAQI DELEGATION TO IRAN  
TO DISCUSS THE SHATT-AL-ARAB OF WHICH HE HAD READ IN THE PRESS.  
NADIM SAID THAT THESE PRESS REPORTS WERE NOT TRUE.  
THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR SUCH A DELEGATION TO COME.  
HE CONFIRMED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO GO AHEAD  
WITH THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS (NO DATE HAD YET BEEN  
FIXED FOR THE IRAQI TO ARRIVE).

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REGISTR' N 35

10 DEC 1973

NBA 3/324/1

Mr Wright

I agree with this conclusion.

Mr. Bunt 19/12  
p. 19

Phu 8/12

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1 Tehran tels nos. 898 and 899 report that Iranian-Iraqi relations are even less warm than we thought. <sup>L</sup> Diplomatic relations were resumed on 8 October that no Ambassadors have yet arrived in either Baghdad or Tehran (I can only assume that Mr Mirfakhrai had this totally wrong). In the light of these details and particularly as the friction appears to have arisen over naval vessels in the Shatt Al Arab, I think we will need to consider even more carefully any question of approval for a licence to export hovercraft to Iraq.

P. K. Williams

P K Williams  
Middle East Department

7 December 1973

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**British Embassy**  
Tehran


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P K Williams Esq  
MED  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 3/5

Date 28 December 1973



Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

1. Prospects for an improvement in relations are still not good.
2. The incident of the Iraqi Note reported in our telnos. 898 and 899 (not to all) has probably been forgotten by the Iranians. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have given some credence to an explanation of the Iraqi action, that the Note was delivered by a junior Iraqi Charge d'Affaires who misinterpreted his instructions from Baghdad. But when the Ambassador saw the Minister of Court on 10 December, Alam said that Iran had no illusions that the Iraqi regime were sincere in wishing to improve relations (he thought it likely that the Iraqis had been taken by surprise when the Iranians had agreed to resume relations). The Russians, Alam thought, did not really wish to see an improvement in Iraq/Iran relations though they were, of course, careful not to precipitate chaotic situations near the Soviet frontier. The Russians were undoubtedly working (through the Iraqis where necessary) to undermine the Shah and his Government though this was a long term policy.
3. Alam was also sceptical about reports which had been appearing here that the Leaders of the pro-Peking faction of the Tudeh Party in Iraq had been expelled by the Iraqi Government. Alam claimed that these men (he named General Panahian and Mohsen Kalantari) had simply gone to Beirut "for some conference".
4. A newspaper report of 24 December claimed that the Iraqi Ambassador designate to Iran would arrive shortly. Even if he does, it appears that he will do little to contribute to rapprochement. Alam remarked pointedly to the Ambassador that they were sending the man who had helped to assassinate Takhruti in Kuwait.

LAST PAPER

LAST PAPER

Yours sincerely,  
N W Browne

N W Browne

cc: Chanceries:  
JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
WASHINGTON



Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq And Iran. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 6 Jan. 1973. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2094. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472298/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=5364333f&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472298/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=5364333f&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.